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DISRUPTION TO DISASTER: 
THE CASE STUDY OF FOR-PROFIT LEGAL 
EDUCATION IN RIAZ TEJANI’S LAW MART 
ANDREW W. JURS† 
INTRODUCTION 
Rarely a day goes by without headlines hailing new approaches 
to legal education, from mild changes to major modifications to the 
existing order.  These new approaches range from minor tweaks to 
major overhauls and, in recent years, have included innovations 
such as formative assessment, flipped classrooms, two-year JD 
programs, tiered licensing, GRE admissions, online education, and 
refocusing on practice skills or professionalism—to name a few.  
Our era of disruption is a time to stop and reflect upon an earlier 
story of legal education experimentation, namely the rise and 
eventual collapse of for-profit legal education.1  It is a story out-
lined in compelling detail in Riaz Tejani’s Law Mart,2 and one 
which can be consolidated into a single question with many ramifi-
cations: how does the for-profit model affect the management and 
outcomes in postgraduate legal education?  It is a perfectly reason-
able question, and one I myself asked many years ago while 
interviewing for a position at a school managed by the InfiLaw 
† Associate Dean of Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, Drake University Law 
School; J.D., 2000, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law; B.A., 1997, 
Stanford University. Thanks to Katie, Clara, and Milo. 
1 Regarding the collapse and closing of two of the three InfiLaw schools, see Anne 
Ryman, Arizona Summit Law School Won’t Offer Classes This Fall; Students Told To 
Transfer, AZCENTRAL (Aug. 19, 2018, 3:52 PM), https://www.azcentral.com/story/ 
news/local/arizona-education/2018/08/14/arizona-summit-law-school-wont-offer-classes-
fall-2018/988268002/ [https://perma.cc/7BRF-6MWF]; Elizabeth Olson, Unable To 
Reverse Its Fortunes and Now Unlicensed, Charlotte School of Law Closes, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 16, 2017, at B3. The third school, the Florida Coastal School of Law, had been 
been found to be out of compliance with ABA accreditation standards but remained in 
operation. Lorelei Laird, Florida Coastal Still out of Compliance with Accreditation 
Standards, ABA Legal Ed Council Says, A.B.A. J. (Sept. 4, 2018, 3:13 PM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/florida_coastal_is_still_out_of_compliance_aba 
_legal_ed_council_says [https://perma.cc/5HXH-BL84].  
2 See generally RIAZ TEJANI, LAW MART (2017). 
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System.3  As I slowly came to learn, and as Tejani makes clear in 
his work, the answer to the question depends largely on who you 
ask.  That does not mean, however, that there is not an answer.  
Tejani’s analysis of for-profit legal education offers a caution-
ary lesson as we approach contemporary proposals for major 
modifications to legal education.  That lesson involved the failure 
of the ABA to appropriately regulate innovations in legal educa-
tion to protect students, faculty members, and the public at large.  
Tejani is well-positioned to assess these issues.  He was a pro-
fessor at Arizona Summit School of Law, an InfiLaw-managed for-
profit law school, from 2011 to 2014.  His analysis rings true to me, 
as I also taught at a different InfiLaw-managed school—Florida 
Coastal School of Law—for two years from 2009 to 2011.4  For 
those not familiar with this corner of the legal education world, it 
may come as a surprise how the for-profit model corrodes manage-
ment practices of the schools in question.  I count three cascading 
effects of the for-profit model in management.  First, the for-profit 
model permeates the structure of the schools to the core, affecting 
their location, their size, and their faculty hiring practices.  
Second, since the schools are structured to develop profits, this 
prerogative inevitably leads to a decline in true faculty governance 
as business concerns trump educational and pedagogical consid-
erations.  Finally, the business structure and lack of faculty 
governance leads to very poor outcomes for students who attend 
these schools, badly serving those students and the clients they 
may eventually represent.  Most insidious of all, after manage-
ment’s decisions invariably result in terrible student outcomes, 
management may cast the blame on the students themselves, as 
at Tejani’s school.5  
Tejani’s work describes the management practices, the lack of 
faculty governance, and the poor student outcomes at for-profit 
schools and ascribes them to a fundamental theoretical mistake: 
that neoliberal economic theories in this sphere lead to systematic 
breakdown through the conscious separation of risk and reward.  
 
3 InfiLaw is a company which serves as the management hub for (formerly) three 
for-profit law schools, two of which have closed in recent years. See supra note 1 and 
accompanying text. Infilaw is owned by Sterling Partners, a private equity fund from 
Chicago. See Portfolio, STERLING PARTNERS, http://privateequity.sterlingpartners 
.com/#portfolio [https://perma.cc/4VSW-EMV6] (last visited Dec. 26, 2020). 
4 I interviewed for a position at Florida Coastal School of Law in October and 
November 2008 and worked there from July 2009 to June 2011. However, I have not 
met nor conversed with Tejani, nor did our employment dates coincide. 
5 For more on this, see infra Part III. 
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By exposing the fallacy of for-profit legal education for what it is, 
Law Mart creates a compelling and absorbing narrative of legal 
education and the failure of oversight methodologies, and it is a 
damning indictment not only of the industry but also the accred-
itors who claim to regulate it.  To those who have not considered 
the for-profit model, who suspect there is no effect, or who are 
concerned about the ABA enforcement of accreditation standards, 
I invite you to read Tejani’s work.  As to both the substance of 
innovation as well as the failure of regulation, the legal education 
community ought to consider the implications of this failed 
experiment on our current era of disruption.  
I.  THE HISTORY OF THE FOR-PROFIT 
LEGAL EDUCATION MARKET 
InfiLaw’s Arizona Summit Law School and Charlotte School 
of Law have both closed in recent years, while its third and final 
school, the Florida Coastal School of Law, remained out of 
compliance with ABA accreditation standards for many years after 
the law school crisis.6  Meanwhile, non-InfiLaw for-profit schools 
have had similar problems, as demonstrated by the closing of the 
Savannah Law School—a branch of Atlanta’s John Marshall Law 
School—and the near-collapse of the Charleston School of Law.7  
Under these circumstances, one may wonder why for-profit legal 
education had ever been considered a good idea and why it ever 
was approved by the ABA. 
To answer that question, Tejani begins his book with a 
discussion of how the ABA was reluctant to accredit for-profit legal 
education at all.  The President of the American Bar Foundation 
at the time, Bryant Garth, described the reaction to the 
applications for accreditation from for-profit schools as follows: 
“[E]verybody in legal education pretty much, including me . . . did 
 
6 See Laird, supra note 1. 
7 Tyler Roberts, Savannah Law School Is Closing After Seven Years, NAT’L JURIST 
(Mar. 23, 2018, 10:08 AM), http://www.nationaljurist.com/national-jurist-magazine/ 
savannah-law-school-closing-after-seven-years [https://perma.cc/9WCM-7WDR]; Paul 
Bowers, For Second Year, Most Charleston School of Law Grads Failed the July Bar 
Exam, POST & COURIER (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.postandcourier.com/news/for-
second-year-most-charleston-school-of-law-grads-failed/article_45fcdd56-db7d-11e8-
a8bc-2f483d8d1986.html [https://perma.cc/U6R7-RT4J]; Orin Kerr, Charleston School 
of Law To Close?, WASH. POST.: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 7, 2015, 1:29 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/05/07/charleston-
school-of-law-to-close/ [https://perma.cc/P58Y-HVHJ]. 
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not want the for-profits to come.  We all thought it would under-
mine some of the values that we think are fundamental to legal 
education . . . .”8  Garth stated that when the for-profits sued in 
antitrust, the ABA was forced to “capitulate” and accredit these 
programs, even if they did not wish to do so beforehand.9  For 
Tejani, the capitulation of the ABA was indicative of a laissez-faire 
approach of “letting the market decide.”10  
Through accreditation, for-profit legal education donned itself 
in the cloak of disruption as a group of “antielitist” rebels promis-
ing innovation in a stodgy world of prestige-obsessed academics.11  
Viewed in their best light, the schools promised an innovative 
environment with new technology in the classroom, new professors 
with practice experience, and a relentless focus on student pre-
paredness for practice.12  The schools also promised to reach out to 
students of color and help remediate the lack of diversity in the 
legal community.13  With those objectives, the ABA could rest 
assured that the for-profit model would be one of “differentiation” 
but not wildly inconsistent with the previously existing approach 
to legal education.14  
Even with these promises, the laissez-faire approach had 
fundamental flaws from the start.  Accreditation of for-profit legal 
education, to Tejani, is indicative of a larger problem in which 
neoliberal values of market fundamentalism, deregulation, and 
value maximization permeate society in areas previously unwil-
ling to embrace those ideologies.15  However, once the neoliberal 
approach to legal education is adopted, the values of neoliberalism 
warp the educational model. 
Tejani explains that the for-profit model contains self-
destructive attributes that degrade and destabilize the previously 
established legal education models.  The core problem is the “mor-
al hazard” of separating the risk of the endeavor from the profits 
it generates.16  Just as mortgage-backed securities destabilized the 
 
8 TEJANI, supra note 2, at 4 (second alteration in original). 
9 Id.; see generally Andy Portinga, Note, ABA Accreditation of Law Schools: An 
Antitrust Analysis, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 635 (1996). 
10 TEJANI, supra note 2, at 4. 
11 Id. at 80. 
12 On the issue of innovation, see id. at 80; on the issue of practice readiness, see 
id. at 63. 
13 Id. at 16–17. 
14 Id. at 5. 
15 Id. at 5–7. 
16 Id. at 5. 
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housing market and helped lead to the Great Recession, the moral 
hazard of profit and risk separation would destabilize for-profit 
legal education at the InfiLaw schools. 
Even before the titanic forces of the Great Recession began to 
tear apart for-profit legal education, InfiLaw knew that selling a 
message of profiteering and neoliberalism on its face would not be 
a successful marketing strategy.  In response, Tejani explains, 
they reacted by creating a facade of culture-based rationales for 
their model.  These “mission pillars” include “serving the under-
served, providing student-outcome centered education, and 
graduating students who are practice-ready.”17  One can immedi-
ately see that these mission pillars directly explain the market 
differentiation that InfiLaw sought to obtain, and they were 
marketed as such,18 but to Tejani their true purpose was more 
nefarious.  The culture, he states, “functioned to hold back com-
munity reflection on the moral hazard of for-profit legal 
education.”19  So while the mission pillar of “serving the under-
served” sought to show outside observers the positive results that 
disruption could bring, it served the inside purpose of showing a 
socially conscious mission to investors.20  However, once invest-
ments have been made, the for-profit model, by its very nature, 
demands “perennial growth.”21  The need for profit expansion led 
to contradictions between actions and explanations, as when the 
corporation sought new revenue from increasingly vulnerable 
students but then used the “mission pillars” to remind its person-
nel that the “mission was ideologically praiseworthy.”22  Similar 
dynamics affect the other mission pillars of student-outcome-
centered education and creating practice-ready graduates.  
Maybe, without the Great Recession, this for-profit model 
could have puttered along without catastrophic consequences, but 
even before the law school crisis it was clear that major fault lines 
lay underneath the neoliberal approach to legal education.  I can 
personally attest to the existence of these problems, as my own 
experiences at an InfiLaw school before the post-recession legal 
education collapse revealed the irreconcilable cross-purposes in-
herent in the for-profit model.  However, the weaknesses in for-
 
17 Id. at 62. 
18 Id. at 64. 
19 Id. at 60. 
20 Id. at 69. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 71. 
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profit legal education would be dramatically exposed to all by the 
reduction in law school applications during the law school crisis of 
2012 and beyond. 
II.  THE “LAW SCHOOL CRISIS”AND THE  
MANAGEMENT RESPONSE 
Very few expected the rapid decline in legal education that 
occurred in the 2010s, and once it started, no one knew when the 
decline would end.  In the 2010–2011 academic year, 52,448 1L 
students entered ABA-approved law schools—a record high.23  By 
the 2015–2016 academic year, the entering class had fallen to 
37,071—nearly a thirty-percent collapse.24  The colossal changes 
in legal education in these years altered management styles and 
practices at a great many law schools, but the effect on the InfiLaw 
schools—as documented by Tejani in the most compelling chapters 
of his book—demonstrates the fundamental contradictions of their 
model. 
Like most law schools, Arizona Summit, where Tejani was 
teaching, saw steep declines in applications between 2012 and 
2014.25  In the years immediately preceding the downturn, the 
school’s investment prospectus indicated a near-term growth of 
the student body to over 500 students per year, a number de-
scribed as a forty percent increase each year and “what investors 
want to see.”26  To meet the needs of those larger classes, the school 
made two major decisions with lasting impacts: it hired a cohort of 
twelve tenure-track and permanent legal research and writing 
professors in the 2011–2012 academic year, and it signed a ten-
year lease for an enhanced location in the Phoenix city center.27  
Instead of phenomenal growth, however, the next few years saw a 
steep downward trend in the legal education market.  Declining 
revenues quickly led to major institutional problems.  
 
23 AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, 
ENROLLMENT AND DEGREES AWARDED, 1963–2012 ACADEMIC YEARS, https://www 
.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to
_the_bar/statistics/enrollment_degrees_awarded.pdf [https://perma.cc/24YZ-RJR5] 
(last visited Dec. 26, 2020).  
24 AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, ABA LAW 
SCHOOL DATA: CHANGE IN 1L MATRICULANTS, 2016 v. 2015 (Dec. 15, 2016), https:// 
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions 
_to_the_bar/statistics/2016_v_2015_1l_matriculants.xlsx [https://perma.cc/ANA9-V45M].  
25 TEJANI, supra note 2, at 105. 
26 Id. at 106–07. 
27 Id. at 89. 
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To understand the scope of the problem, it helps to understand 
the magnitude of the decline.  On the front end, total applications 
declined from 450 in the 2011 admissions cycle to 262 in 2014.28  
Simultaneously, more students who started at Arizona Summit 
transferred to other schools, with twenty percent leaving at the 
start of the slide and the number increasing to an unspecified “all-
time high” the next year.29  Declining applications and increased 
transfers from the top of the class quickly altered the composition 
of the student body.  The median LSAT/GPA for entering students 
had been 148/3.05 in 2011; by 2013, the profile had fallen to 
144/2.88.30  Even more troubling, many of the top students trans-
ferred to other schools, resulting in a student body with a 
disproportionate number of at-risk students.31  These circum-
stances challenged the school’s fundamental model. 
The administration initially responded with several modest 
measures.  First, to increase the number of students eligible to 
enroll, the school transformed its Alternative Admissions Model 
Program for Legal Education (“AAMPLE”) program—a supple-
mentary program initially designed to identify low-score but high-
potential students32—into an “alternative admissions” system.33  
Meanwhile, on the issue of transfer attrition, the school added 
procedural steps that required potential transfer students to meet 
with administrators prior to leaving and sometimes prior to 
applying to transfer,34 then emphasizing the “we took a chance on 
you” nature of the school.35  Some would even deny letters of 
recommendation to transfer students.36  Yet by the 2012–2013 
academic year, these measures failed to reverse the negative 
enrollment trends for the school. 
 
28 Id. at 105. 
29 Id. at 101 (discussing the twenty percent figure for the 2011–2012 academic 
year); see also id. at 129 (“all-time high”). 
30 Arizona Summit Law School: Admissions, L. SCH. TRANSPARENCY, https://www 
.lstreports.com/schools/arizonasummit/admissions/ [https://perma.cc/MM33-3GW9] 
(last visited Aug 10, 2020) (detailing statistics for the years 2010 through 2017).  
31 See TEJANI, supra note 2, at 101. 
32 Id. at 50–51, 183. 
33 Id. at 51 (explaining that enrollment from AAMPLE rose from eleven percent 
of that class in 2005 to eighty percent in 2011); id. at 55–56 (describing the use of 
AAMPLE as a way to justify increased admissions and revenue); id. at 183 (stating 
that the law school increased their admission of AAMPLE students over time). 
34 Id. at 100. 
35 Id. at 101. 
36 Id. at 101–02, 168. 
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Since these more modest measures could not reverse the 
downward trends at Arizona Summit, the administration took the 
major—and catastrophic—step of completely overhauling the 
school’s curriculum.  Tejani makes clear that the plan—the “Legal 
Education 2.0” initiative created by McKinsey business consul-
tants—never had the intention of helping students with their 
educational goals or as future attorneys.37  Instead, the initiative 
served two different goals, primarily to soothe investors who 
sensed their capital commitments to the InfiLaw venture were in 
jeopardy38 and, later, to market the school as different and 
innovative to prospective students.39  With those purposes, the 
mechanisms would never be as important as the perception of 
curricular innovation; however, in essence the plan was to engage 
in “course integration” by combining first-year law classes in pairs: 
“torts with civil procedure, contracts with property, and legal 
writing with criminal law.”40  
Whether or not these curricular reforms had—or have—merit, 
the story of the Law 2.0 initiative is instead one about the depths 
to which InfiLaw management would sink to achieve the goal of 
its implementation.  Since the proposals were business-model-
driven, InfiLaw management recognized the need for a veneer of 
faculty input.41  So the school created committees to review the 
proposals, although as Tejani makes clear, these committees were 
never intended to serve a role of true review but were instead 
stacked with administration-friendly faculty and “noninstruction-
al staff.”42  Meanwhile, as the committees met to discuss proposals, 
the Dean made clear that immediate implementation would be 
necessary: “Our public relations department is already chomping 
at the bit to market this new program . . . .”43 
What I found remarkable in this part of the story is that, while 
facing a clear mandate from the corporate management of InfiLaw 
to pass the Law 2.0 initiative, the faculty repeatedly expressed 
misgivings about the effect of the proposal on the students.44  In 
response, the Dean of the School made two ominous statements: 
 
37 Id. at 112, 132. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 131. 
40 Id. at 128–30 (emphasis omitted). 
41 See id. at 131–32. 
42 Id. at 121, 132. 
43 Id. at 131 (emphasis omitted). 
44 Id. at 136–38. 
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first, that even if the faculty voted it down it would be imple-
mented anyway; and second, that the Law 2.0 program was the 
school’s chance “to build a better mousetrap.”45  Remarkably, in 
spite of the management’s wishes, the faculty voted against the 
proposal.46 
Those who believe faculty governance is an important value 
will be appalled at what happened next.  The Dean’s initial re-
sponse was to declare the faculty vote to be an endorsement of the 
proposal.47  Next, committees consisting of nontenured faculty, 
staff, and academic support counselors “reworked” the Law 2.0 
plan, although Tejani makes clear these late-stage changes were 
“de minimis.”48  Most insidious of all, management manipulated 
who would be eligible to vote on the proposal in subsquent meet-
ings by firing one prominent critic of the proposal and hiring 
several visiting professors close to the Dean.49  It should surprise 
no one to learn that eventually the Law 2.0 initiative passed.50  
Yet even after the passage of the consultant’s plan, InfiLaw 
would continue to retaliate against those deemed disloyal.  At the 
end of the academic year, two additional critics of the initiative—
a married couple—did not have their contracts renewed.51  Both 
were tenured at the time.52  The message was clear to all remain-
ing faculty: “[P]rofessors felt disheartened that the most vocal 
among them could be removed for standing up for students.”53  The 
dismissals “meant that the security to write or speak out against 
popular or executive decisions—even in designated spaces for 
faculty deliberation—was attenuated . . . .”54  
In the final coup de grâce, Tejani then notes that shortly after 
the Law 2.0 initiative, the American Bar Association Section on 
Legal Education and the Bar sent a site inspection team to his 
school for a regular review of compliance with ABA standards.55  
 
45 Id. at 138. 
46 Id. at 144. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 150. 
49 Id. at 150–51. 
50 Id. at 151. 
51 Id. at 157. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 173.  
54 Id.  
55 Id. at 186. At the time of the events in question, the ABA Section of Legal 
Education and Admission to the Bar required a site visit every seven years. AM. BAR 
ASS’N SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, ABA STANDARDS AND 
RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, 2013–2014, at 77 (2013), 
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The timing could not have been any worse for management, occur-
ring only months after the Law 2.0 fight.56 
ABA standards, familiar to most professors and all adminis-
trators of ABA-accredited law schools, mandate certain minimum 
standards in areas including faculty governance,57 academic 
freedom,58 “security of position” for faculty,59 admissions stan-
dards,60 and bar passage rate.61  Yet even in the face of the Law 2.0 
debacle, the site visit team never raised serious questions about 
the governance style at the school,62 confounding Tejani’s 
perception that the school was “bound for reprimand”63 and 
frustrating others’ beliefs that the ABA should have done more.64  
ABA site visit documents are not publicly available, but the fact 
that the school remained accredited suggests the accuracy of these 




_law_schools_body.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/HJP7-PYEZ] [hereinafter 
ABA STANDARDS AND RULES 2013–2014]. Since that time, the Council has modified 
site visit frequency to every ten years. AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & 
ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL 




56 The final and deciding vote on the Law 2.0 proposal occurred on February 26, 
2013. TEJANI, supra note 2, at 151. The ABA site visit to the school occurred Septem-
ber 29 to October 2, 2013. AM. BAR ASS’N, SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO 
THE BAR, THE CHALLENGES OF LEADERSHIP: 2013–2014 ANNUAL REPORT 29, 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_education/201
3_2014_annual_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/TNM8-ARF5] (last visited Dec. 26, 2020). 
57 See ABA STANDARDS AND RULES 2013–2014, supra note 55, at 13 (Standard 207 
required “faculty [to] have a significant role in determining educational policy.”). 
58 Id. at 34 (Standard 405(b) required a law school to “have an established and 
announced policy with respect to academic freedom and tenure.”). 
59 Id. (Standard 405(b) required a law school to have an established policy on 
tenure, while 405(c) required clinical faculty to have “a form of security of position 
reasonably similar to tenure” and 405(d) required “security of position” for legal 
writing faculty.). 
60 Id. at 37 (Standard 501(a) required law schools to “maintain sound admission 
policies and practices,” while 501(b) prohibited law schools from admitting applicants 
“who do not appear capable of satisfactorily completing its educational program and 
being admitted to the bar.”). 
61 See id. at 19–21 (Interpretation 301-6 explained detailed metrics for assess-
ment of bar passage rates, to determine compliance with Standard 301 regarding 
maintenance of “an educational program that prepares its students for admission to 
the bar.”). 
62 TEJANI, supra note 2, at 186. 
63 Id. at 177. 
64 Id. at 186. 
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As a coda to the story, I will note that the bar passage rate for 
Arizona Summit continued to drop, as Tejani anticipated it would, 
from 75.8% in 2010 to 27.6% in 2017.65  The ABA, in reaction to a 
bar passage rate of thirty-three percent in 2016, placed the school 
on probation in March 2017 for failing to comply with ABA 
Standards on Admission and Academic Standards.66  In May 2018, 
Arizona Summit’s bar passage rate continued its decline, clearly 
establishing that the school failed to comply with ABA standards, 
and so the ABA finally revoked the accreditation in June 2018.67  
InfiLaw responded by filing a lawsuit against the ABA, although 
that suit was ultimately dismissed in January 2019.68 
III.  IMPLICATIONS 
By examining the business practices of the for-profit legal 
education model under the strain of the post-recession bubble 
bursting, Tejani explores the insidious effects of profit-driven legal 
 
65 Arizona Summit Law School: Bar Exam Outcomes, L. SCH. TRANSPARENCY, 
https://www.lstreports.com/schools/arizonasummit/bar/ [https://perma.cc/B4H5-V8GB] 
(last visited Aug. 10, 2020) (detailing bar passage rates there between 2008 and 2017). 
66 Memorandum from Barry A. Currier, Managing Dir. of Accreditation and Legal 




dam.pdf [https://perma.cc/AZW6-KC89]. See also Anne Ryman, Arizona Summit Law 
School in Phoenix Put on Probation for Law Bar-Passage Rates, AZCENTRAL (Mar. 27, 
2017, 4:54 PM), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/phoenix-education/2017/ 
03/27/arizona-summit-law-school-probation-low-bar-passage-rates/99698686/ [https:// 
perma.cc/M2M2-FC67]. 
67 Public Memorandum from Barry A. Currier, Managing Dir. of Accreditation 
and Legal Educ., Am. Bar Ass’n, to Licensing Auths. for the State of Arizona (June 8, 
2018), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education 
_and_admissions_to_the_bar/18_june_arizona_summit_public_notice.authcheckdam.
pdf [https://perma.cc/9GXC-PXJK]. See also Stephanie Francis Ward, Arizona Sum-
mit Loses Accreditation Approval, Which May Be a First for an Operating Law School, 
A.B.A. J. (June 11, 2018, 9:30 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/arizona 
_summit_loses_accreditation_approval_which_may_be_a_first_for_operat [https://perma 
.cc/CH47-ZB8B]. 
68 Stephanie Francis Ward, Arizona Summit Sues ABA, 3rd For-Profit InfiLaw 
School To Do So, A.B.A. J. (May 24, 2018, 5:17 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/ 
article/arizona_summit_sues_aba_3rd_for-profit_infilaw_school_to_do_so [https://perma 
.cc/KE3V-STTV]. The complaint is publicly available. Complaint, Arizona Summit 
Law School, LLC v. Am. Bar Ass’n, No. 18-CV-01580 (D. Ariz. May 24, 2018), 
http://www.abajournal.com/images/main_images/Arizona_Summit_ABA_complaint.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3G5D-M63C]. The dismissal is posted on the court’s docket. Order 
Granting Stipulation of Dismissal, Arizona Summit Law School, LLC v. Am. Bar 
Ass’n, No. 18-CV-01580 (D. Ariz. Jan. 15, 2019). 
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education.  In so doing, his exposé should serve as a warning to 
future “disruptors” in the field. 
In legal education, profit motive affects the core structure and 
setup of the schools operating under this model.  Incentive struc-
tures will differ greatly among schools imbued with a profit motive 
when basic choices are made about the schools’ location, size, or 
faculty hiring practices.  Locations for a for-profit law school must 
be underserved by law schools of similar academic profiles, must 
have a sufficient number of working adults to consider advanced 
training, and must serve a legal market of sufficient size to absorb 
graduates of the new school.  Thus, InfiLaw chose to establish or 
buy schools in large cities—Phoenix, Charlotte, and Jacksonville—
without competing law schools nearby,69 in states with double-
digit population growth,70 and in states without lawyer satura-
tion.71  Similarly, the profit motive affects whom the school will 
hire and under what terms.  Tejani explains that faculty at InfiLaw 
schools would be split between traditional doctrinal faculty, often 
hired on the national hiring market, as he was, and members of 
the local bar as “teaching track” faculty.72  Since faculty on the 
teaching track were not subjected to the same standards of tenure, 
their positions contributed to what Tejani calls “managed 
precarity”—a system whereby employees are loyal out of feelings 
of insecurity rather than out of choice.73   
In Law Mart, Tejani spends significant time describing the 
hiring practices of the schools and, to some extent, relates these to 
 
69 Of course, Charlotte and Jacksonville had no other law schools. Phoenix did, 
with Arizona State, but the student profile of A.S.U. indicates it is unlikely to be a 
direct competitor with Arizona Summit. Compare Arizona Summit Law School: 
Admissions, supra note 30 (detailing statistics for the years 2010 through 2019), with 
Arizona State University: Admissions, L. SCH. TRANSPARENCY, https://www.lstreports 
.com/schools/asu/admissions/ [https://perma.cc/TB9W-GRYY] (last visited Dec. 26, 
2020) (detailing statistics for the years 2010 through 2019). 
70 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION DISTRIBUTION AND CHANGE: 2000 TO 2010 
tbl.1 (March 2011), https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-01.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/W5XE-CFUV].  
71 See AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA NATIONAL LAWYER POPULATION SURVEY: 10-YEAR 
TREND IN LAWYER POPULATION BY STATE (2015), https://noticiasmicrojuris.files 
.wordpress.com/2016/01/national-lawyer-population-by-state-2005-2015.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/G6Y4-8XW3] (last visited Dec. 26, 2020) (showing thirty-percent or more 
increases in lawyers in Arizona, Florida, and North Carolina); Matt Leichter, Lawyers 
Per Capita By State, THE LAST GEN X AMERICAN, https://lawschooltuitionbubble 
.wordpress.com/original-research-updated/lawyers-per-capita-by-state/ [https://perma 
.cc/KUE3-Y4Q2] (last visited Dec. 26, 2020). 
72 TEJANI, supra note 2, at 39–40, 124–25. 
73 Id. at 28 (emphasis omitted). 
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the instability of the for-profit schools, but does not tie these on a 
fundamental level to choices made at the time of the schools’ setup.  
I suspect this has mainly to do with his employment at Arizona 
Summit starting near the beginning of the post-recession admis-
sions slide in 2012, but I think it would have been helpful for a 
deeper review of these earlier foundational matters as a contribut-
ing factor to later instability under the stress test of matriculation 
declines from 2011 to 2015.  
The law school bubble bursting forms the core of the book and 
is where Tejani’s work demonstrates its enormous importance.  
When InfiLaw placed their schools in high-flying regions during 
the early 2000s, they gambled that those areas would continue 
those growth patterns.  However, the states where InfiLaw schools 
were located—Arizona, Florida, and North Carolina—were three 
of the most severely affected states in the country during the Great 
Recession.74  Initially, the response of the InfiLaw schools was 
similar to other schools, in trying to consider alternative strategies 
to deal with the changes in the market.  However, as applications 
dramatically declined, the weaknesses of the for-profit model led 
to a situation striking at the core of faculty governance.  
The priority of profits over pedagogy demonstrates the 
negative effects for-profit can have on faculty governance and in-
structors’ roles not only as instructors but as stewards.  The ABA 
mandates that faculty are to have a primary role in curricular 
matters, and while that standard has been strengthened since 
2012, the Law 2.0 debacle described by Tejani in Law Mart 
violates any standard the ABA could have in the area.  InfiLaw 
management decided that to show market differentiation and to 
attract applicants, they would institute curricular reform created 
by management consulting giant McKinsey and Company.75  The 
faculty objected, having serious concerns about the effect of the 
changes on students, and bravely voted down the changes two 
 
74 See Ana Swanson, They’re Some of the Unluckiest Places in America—and May 
Confirm What’s Wrong with the Economy, WASH. POST (June 23, 2016, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/06/23/the-most-unlucky-places-
in-america/ [https://perma.cc/N82A-RVUB] (citing Florida and Arizona as states with 
the highest negative impact on employment from the Great Recession); Ronald 
Brownstein & Scott Bland, Obama’s Key States Are Among the Hardest Hit by 
Recession, ATLANTIC (Sept. 30, 2011), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/ 
2011/09/obamas-key-states-are-among-the-hardest-hit-by-recession/245948/ [https:// 
perma.cc/D5QW-P9CW] (citing Arizona and Florida as two of the four states hit 
hardest by the recession). 
75 TEJANI, supra note 2, at 132. 
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separate times.76  Yet in response to faculty opposition, manage-
ment reacted not with humility and introspection but with 
vindictiveness and manipulation.  They fired faculty who spoke 
out against the change.77  They told the faculty that InfiLaw would 
impose the change whether or not they passed the proposal.78  
They made clear that votes would continue until passage oc-
curred.79  Finally, management manipulated the number of eligi-
ble voters by hiring additional voting faculty on temporary 
contracts.80  In the end, Law 2.0 passed. 
By tying this narrative to the weaknesses of faculty gover-
nance at Arizona Summit and the failures of ABA oversight 
generally, Tejani serves up a chilling reminder of the importance 
of these abstract principles for all of legal education.  I can find no 
more damning indictment of ABA oversight than his astonishment 
that, mere months after the Law 2.0 debacle, ABA inspection 
teams visited Arizona Summit and never commented on the issue 
at all!81  Considering the shocking failure of the ABA to intervene, 
they too must share some of the blame for negative effects 
continuing after the site visit. 
The final effect of for-profit governance of the InfiLaw schools 
involves the outcomes for the students who enrolled.  It cannot 
surprise anyone to learn that a school more concerned about 
marketing than sound pedagogy,82 about meeting investors’ 
expectations rather than students’ needs,83 and about enrollment 
numbers rather than enrolling students’ credentials84 would run 
into major problems in the post-recession legal education collapse.  
From the high point of 2010–2011, enrollment at Arizona Summit 
declined 42%, from 450 to 262, while the academic profile changed 
from a median LSAT/GPA of 148/3.05 to 144/2.88.85  The problem 
with short-sighted admissions policies is their latency period 
which, by the nature of law school curricula, delays negative 
outcomes.  Since an entering class will usually take three years to 
 
76 Regarding the Law 2.0 change, see supra notes 37–54 and accompanying text. 
77 See supra notes 49, 51 and accompanying text. 
78 See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
79 See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
80 Id. 
81 See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
82 See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
83 See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
84 See supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text. 
85 TEJANI, supra note 2, at 105 (discussing total enrollment); Arizona Summit 
Law School: Admissions, supra note 30 (detailing enrollment profile). 
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complete the program of study, bar results fall in response to 
altered entrance credentials after several years.  This is exactly 
what happened at Arizona Summit.  Starting with a bar pass rate 
of nearly seventy-six percent in 2010, the pass rate for graduates 
of Arizona Summit dropped below fifty percent in 2015—exactly 
three years after the 2012 admissions cycle started the post-
recession enrollment collapse.86  The the bar exam pass rate fell to 
the mid-twenties in 2017, and was 20.4% around the time of the 
accreditation revocation in 2018.87  InfiLaw will tell anyone that 
“ultimate bar pass” is the statistic here that matters, in that all 
one needs to know is whether a student ever finally passes a bar 
exam.88  This is another self-justifying talking point to obfuscate 
the truth, which is that the profit motive led the school to admit 
students who could not pass the bar, and they did not pass the 
bar.89 
Tejani’s treatment of the bar pass issue in Law Mart could 
have been greater, although he connects it to the problem of neo-
liberal management of education since, in a for-profit educational 
model, the risk and reward will always be separate—risk for the 
student, reward for management.90  Had the manuscript of Law 
 
86 Arizona Summit Law School: Bar Exam Outcomes, supra note 65 (detailing 
statistics for the years 2008 through 2018).  
87 Comm. on Examinations, July 2018 Examination Results, ARIZ. SUP. CT., 
https://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/26/admis/Stats/July2018ArizonaUBEStatisticsfinal
20181031.pdf [https://perma.cc/L6NA-S5EU] (last visited Dec. 26, 2020). Post-
revocation statistics show continued decline, as the pass rate fell to 10.5% for the July 
2019 examination and 3.03% for the February 2020 test. Comm. on Examinations, 
July 2019 Examination Results, ARIZ. SUP. CT., https://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/ 
26/admis/2019/AZUBE_719StatsRevised.pdf [https://perma.cc/XAK9-C7AL] (last vis-
ited Dec. 26, 2020); Comm. on Examination, February 2020 Examination Results, 
ARIZ. SUP. CT., https://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/26/admis/Stats/AZUBE_220Stats.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8MTU-5FC4] (last visited Dec. 26, 2020).  
88 Anne Ryman, Arizona Summit Law School Has Nation’s Lowest Bar Passage 
Rate for ‘15 Graduates, AZCENTRAL (May 21, 2019, 2:56 PM), https://www.azcentral 
.com/story/news/local/arizona-education/2018/03/23/arizona-summit-law-school-second-
lowest-bar-passage-rates-country/450085002/ [https://perma.cc/32JS-M588] (showing 
InfiLaw employees defending “ultimate bar passage”); Debra Cassens Weiss, This 
Law School Had a 30% Bar Pass Rate; Do Lower Standards Presage Troubled Times 
for Law Grads?, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 26, 2015, 9:03 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/ 
article/this_law_school_had_a_30_bar_pass_rate_is_it_a_sign_of_more_widespread_fail 
[https://perma.cc/WK5U-6BXS] (same). 
89 Paul Campos discussed the collapse in pass rate three years after low 
admissions standards in an article published in The Atlantic. Paul Campos, The Law-
School Scam Continues, ATLANTIC (Oct. 23, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/ 
education/archive/2015/10/law-school-scam-getting-worse/412159/ [https://perma.cc/ 
FV4T-7V4J]. 
90 TEJANI, supra note 2, at 3–6. 
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Mart been completed a year later than it was, I suspect that he 
would have spent more time here, mainly because this issue is the 
one that finally resulted in ABA attention: the ABA revoked 
Summit’s accreditation in July 2018.91  But whether or not the 
book follows the story to its end, it highlights the disastrous 
consequences of for-profit management for those least able to 
afford them. 
I will note one final irony, one which leapt off of the page at 
me when I read it because it seemed to summarize the InfiLaw 
ethos.  In his conclusion, Tejani explains InfiLaw’s greatest trick 
of all: to cast the failure of students to obtain jobs as a matter of 
“personal responsibility” rather than any “structural” forces or 
“disadvantage” in play.92  Having read the first seven chapters of 
the book, anyone would conclude the “blame the victim” mentality 
is morally bankrupt and reprehensible.  For InfiLaw, however, it 
is entirely consistent with its neoliberal approach to education—
privatized gains from risk shifting to the individual—and explains 
perfectly why for-profit has no place in legal education. 
CONCLUSION 
Law Mart is an engaging read about an important story 
involving the risk and collapse of for-profit legal education.  Tying 
the rise of proprietary education to neoliberal corporate practices, 
Tejani shows why the schools were structured the way they are 
and why, within those structures, the seeds of their destruction 
had already been planted.  Anyone who has followed the ups and 
downs of legal education in the 2010s would be interested in 
learning about the impact of the recession on these schools. 
More importantly, the book also shows why they lasted as long 
as they did, mainly because of ABA acquiescence.  Months after 
the Law 2.0 debacle, the ABA council had a perfect opportunity to 
shift management practices of Arizona Summit by threatening 
sanctions for obvious noncompliance with ABA standards on 
admissions and faculty governance.  Yet the ABA did nothing.  Its 
failure to engage in real oversight made a mockery of the rules, 
and real people—students, faculty, and the public—got hurt in the 
process. 
As legal education considers the next great wave of innovation 
and change, we should all keep in mind this lesson, and remain 
 
91 See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text. 
92 TEJANI, supra note 2, at 206 (emphasis added). 
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diligent so that it does not occur again.  Tejani brought this lesser-
known but important story to light and deserves great credit for 
doing so. 
 
